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CASES NOTED
THE SUPREME COURT GIVES THE GREEN LIGHT TO
SEARCHES INCIDENT TO TRAFFIC ARRESTS
Is a full custody search incident to a valid arrest for a traffic viola-
tion justifiable where there is no possibility of obtaining further evidence
of the crime charged? This question was raised when Willie Robinson was
stopped and arrested for driving his motor vehicle without a valid license
by an officer who obtained probable cause for the arrest as a result of
information gathered during a previous routine spot-check of Robinson.'
Following standard police procedures, Robinson was searched, and,
during the course of this pat-down, the officer felt an object in Robinson's
pocket. Although there was no indication that it was a weapon, the officer
examined the object and found it to be a crumpled cigarette package con-
taining 14 capsules of white powder which later proved to be heroin. The
heroin seized from Robinson was admitted into evidence at his trial which
resulted in his conviction for a narcotics offense. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia reversed the lower court, holding that where
one is arrested for a traffic violation for which there is no evidentiary
basis for a search, the scope of the search must be strictly limited to an
intrusion reasonably required to discover dangerous weapons, and any
search which exceeds those limits will be held to be unreasonable under
the fourth amendment . On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
held, reversed: A search which is incident to a lawful arrest for a traffic
violation is ipso facto reasonable under the fourth amendment and needs
no further justification. United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973).
The fourth amendment, being the embodiment of the concept that
individual liberty depends in large part upon freedom from unreasonable
intrusion by those in authority,4 forbids every search that is unreasonable
and, consequently, has been liberally construed to safeguard the citizen's
1. The Court of Appeals assumed, and the respondent conceded, that the officer had
probable cause to arrest the respondent and that he effected a full custody arrest. United
States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467, 470 (1973).
2. In a companion case to Robinson, the Court held that police regulations which re-
quire that an arrestee be taken into custody and be subject to a full-scale body search
were of no constitutional significance in determining the validity of a search incident to a
lawful traffic violation arrest. Gustafson v. Florida, 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973).
3. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The fourth amendment
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 700 (1948).
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right of privacy.5 The constitutional requirement that searches by the state
be permitted only upon the issuance of a warrant based upon probable
cause was included in the Constitution so that the decision as to when
the right of privacy must yield to the right to search would be made by a
judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.'
Recognizing the need for judicial review of police intrusions into the sanc-
tity of citizens' lives, the Court has held that warrantless searches are
unreasonable per se under the fourth amendment,7 subject only to a few
specifically established judicial exceptions 8 which "have been jealously and
carefully drawn"9 by the Court. Ultimately, however, the validity of any
search conducted under the fourth amendment, with or without a warrant,
rests upon its reasonableness.' 0
Judicial interpretation of one of these carefully drawn exceptions-
the right to search incident to a lawful arrest-has through the years been
accorded "far from consistent" treatment." Although the right to search
incident to a valid arrest has never been doubted,'" the scope of the search
has been in a constant state of flux.'" The Supreme Court in Robinson
reversed the trend of its prior decisions which increasingly limited the per-
missible scope of warrantless searches.' 4 In addition, the holding conflicts
5. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
6. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
7. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); accord, Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
8. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (only area within arrestee's
control may be searched without a warrant); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)
(police in hot pursuit of armed felon allowed to search premises without a warrant); Zap
v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946) (consent to search obviates warrant requirement);
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (search incident to valid arrest required no
warrant); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (police, having probable cause
that an automobile is being used to commit a felony, were not required to obtain a warrant
due to the mobile nature of the vehicle).
9. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); cf. United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
10. See, e.g., Scbmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966); United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1965).
11. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969).
12. Annot., 82 A.L.R. 782 (1933). See also Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 38 (1914).
13. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), limiting the scope of a search incident
to arrest to the area within the immediate control of the arrestee, overruled United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) where evidence obtained by a search of a desk in the
arrestee's apartment was held admissible. Rabinowitz had in turn overruled Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), which had held that the acquisition of a warrant where
practical was a necessary condition for reasonableness. In overruling Trupiano, the Court
in effect reinstated the rule first enunciated in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927)
and later reiterated in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
14. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (wingspread doctrine); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (search for weapons based on less than probable cause to arrest
limited to pat-down of outer clothing) ; Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (evidence
seized ruled inadmissible because search exceeded Terry standards); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967) (electronic eavesdropping); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967) (limited housing inspections); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932)
(pretext arrest held unreasonable under the fourth amendment). But see Warden v. Hayden,
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with the majority of states' interpretation of the reasonableness require-
ment of the fourth amendment, made binding upon the states through the
fourteenth amendment.15 Prior to the Court's decision in Robinson, many
states held that a search of a suspect who had violated a traffic ordinance
was automatically valid under the fourth and fourteenth amendments; 6
however, a majority of states, 7 encouraged by various commentators, 8
looked at the reasons underlying this warrantless exception and concluded
that a citizen's right to be free from unreasonable intrusions would be
violated by vesting in a law enforcement officer the authority to conduct
a full-custody search of a traffic violator when no other justification was
present.1 9
The search of a person incident to a valid arrest is a long-recognized
exception to the requirement of a search warrant under the fourth amend-
ment. Nevertheless, a search made under the authority of this exception
must meet the reasonableness requirement that is imposed upon all searches
conducted by agents of the government.20 In evaluating the reasonableness
of a search, it is necessary
"first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly
justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected in-
terests of the private citizen," for there is "no ready test for deter-
mining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails."'"
The governmental interest in permitting searches incident to a valid arrest
can be determined by an examination of those cases which formulated
this exception to the requirement of a search warrant.
The first pronouncement by the Court of the "search incident" excep-
387 U.S. 294 (1967) and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) where warrantless
searches were permitted because of exigent circumstances.
15. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643 (1961).
16. E.g., Worthy v. United States, 409 F.2d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ; State v. Gustafson,
258 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973); State v. Coles, 20 Ohio Misc. 12,
249 N.E.2d 553 (C.P. Montgomery County 1969); Watts v. State, 196 So. 2d 79 (Miss.
1967); Lane v. State, 424 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
17. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1104-05 n.39 (1972). There are indica-
tions that some states believe that Robinson is such an infringement upon fourth amendment
rights that they will continue to apply the previous majority position. See People v. Kelly,
42 U.S.L.W. 2471 (N.Y. County Crim. Ct. February 13, 1974).
18. E.g., Simeone, Search and Seizure Incident to Traffic Violations, 6 ST. Louis L.J.
506 (1961); Comment, Search Incident to Arrest for Minor Traffic Violations, 11 Amza.
CRG. L. Rav. 801 (1973); Note, Searches of the Person Incident to Lawful Arrest, 69
COLum. L. Rav. 866 (1969); Note, Search and Seizure-Search Incident to Arrest for Traffic
Violation, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 347 (1959); Note, Scope Limitations for Searches Incident to
Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433 (1969).
19. For a listing of such special circumstances which would endow a police officer
with the right to search one arrested for a traffic violation, see United States v. Robinson,
471 F.2d 1082, 1103-04 n.38 (1972).
20. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966); United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1965).
21. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1099 (1972), quoting Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967).
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tion came in the form of dictum in Weeks v. United States22 which men-
tioned that an officer has the right to search an arrestee without a warrant
"to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime."23 Although many
decisions subsequently reiterated the validity of the exception, a thorough
search of the case law reveals no justification for warrantless searches
incident to an arrest other than the need to obtain and preserve evidence
of the crime charged,24 and the need to disarm the arrestee in order to
minimize the chance of endangering the life of the arresting officer. 25 As
all decisions pronouncing the "search incident" exception were cases in-
volving crimes for which there was evidence capable of being seized, 26
it is readily understandable why the Court gave the police the authority
to search the arrestee. Those searches were reasonable because there was
probable cause to believe that the arrestee still had such evidence on his
person.27 However, the mere occurrence of an arrest does not automatically
vest in the arresting officer authority to effectuate a full-custody search.
A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful
arrest has always been considered to be a strictly limited right.
It grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation at the
time of the arrest. But there must be something more in the
way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest. The mere fact that
there is a valid arrest does not ipso facto legalize a search or
seizure without a warrant.... Otherwise the exception swallows
the general principle, making a search warrant completely un-
necessary wherever there is a lawful arrest.28
The fact that an arrest did not automatically legalize a consequent search
22. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
23. Id. at 392 (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter later noted that the "hint" con-
tained in Weeks was, without persuasive justification, "loosely turned into dictum and finally
elevated to a decision." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 75 (1950) (dissent).
24. Searches of an arrestee for evidence of crimes other than the one connected with
the present arrest have been ruled unconstitutional as exploratory in nature. United States
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344
(1931).
The discussion in Robinson and in this casenote assumes a valid arrest, for searches
incident to an unlawful arrest are ipso facto unreasonable and hence unconstitutional. See
Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
25. E.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), where the Court approved of
this warrantless exception "in order to find and seize things connected with the crime
as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other
things to effect an escape from custody . . . . " Id. at 30 (emphasis added). See also Note,
Scope Limitations for Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433, 434 n.12 (1969).
26. E.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (possession of stolen draft cards);
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (possession of intoxicating liquor); Agnello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (conspiracy to violate Anti-Narcotic Act by possession
of cocaine).
27. See Note, Searches of the Person Incident to Lawful Arrest, 69 CoLum. L. REv.
866, 871 (1969).
28. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948) (citation omitted). Although
Trupiano was expressly overturned by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950),
Rabinowitz was in turn overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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logically led to a case-by-case adjudication of the reasonableness of a par-
ticular search.29
Because individual freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures
is to be abridged only when there is a sufficient state interest, a set of
principles was formulated which narrowly tied a search incident to arrest
to the reasons justifying its conception. A search that starts as a reasonable
intrusion can develop into an unreasonable one by virtue of its intolerable
intensity and scope,"° when the arresting officer exceeds the narrow pur-
poses legitimatizing the search. Although the search of an automobile
incident to an arrest is justified by the need to seize evidence and weapons,
the Court in Preston v. United States"1 determined that a search of a car
after it was towed to the police station was too remote in time or place
to be incident to the arrest because the justifications underlying such a
search were no longer present. The Court in examining the reasons behind
the general rule allowing searches of automobiles incident to arrest, con-
cluded that these reasons were not present in Preston and refused to
apply blindly the general rule to a fact pattern that did not support its
application.
Similarly, the Court in three recent cases, decided that "[t]he scope
of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances
which rendered its initiation permissible." 2 The search in Terry v. Ohio3"
was sustained because the "pat-down" conducted by the officer did not
exceed the scope of the original intrusion, that scope being a protective
search for weapons. However, in Sibron v. New York, 34 a companion
case to Terry, it was made crystal clear that a search which was not
strictly related to the objective of protection would be ruled unconstitu-
tional. The final case in this trilogy of decisions, Peters v. New York, 5
allowed a search incident to an arrest, but only because its scope had been
"reasonably limited" by the "need to seize weapons and . . . to prevent
the destruction of evidence of the crime."3 This series of decisions,
29. See, e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
30. E.g., Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Tinney v. Wilson, 408 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Gonzalez, 319 F. Supp. 563 (D. Conn. 1970).
31. 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
32. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968), citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310
(1967) (Fortas, J., concurring). Although the search in Terry was not incident to arrest
but rather a protective frisk for weapons, the Court in the quoted passage was referring
to all searches.
33. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
34. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). In this case, an officer thrust his hand into Sibron's pockets
and seized some heroin. Thi search was held invalid because
[elven assuming arguendo that there were adequate grounds to search Sibron for
weapons, the nature and scope of the search conducted by [the officer] were so
dearly unrelated to that justification as to render the heroin inadmissible.
Id. at 65.
35. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Peters and Sibron are companion cases.
36. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67, citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364,
367 (1964).
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therefore, clearly implied that a search incident to arrest would be ruled
unconstitutional when it was not strictly related to the underlying pur-
poses which justified its inception.37
Robinson was a case of first impression, in that prior to it, all
decisions that formulated the "search incident" exception concerned
searches that were capable of producing evidence related to the crime
for which the suspect was initially arrested. 8 This case presented the
novel situation in which an arresting officer had in his possession prior
to the search of Robinson the only evidence of the crime for which the
arrest was made. Robinson was arrested for driving without a valid
driver's license and the arresting officer had in his possession before the
search occurred the invalid motor vehicle operator's permit. There being
no evidentiary basis for a search of Robinson's person, 9 one of the
pillars upon which the "search incident" exception was constructed was
absent. The Robinson Court was, therefore, confronted with two choices.
It could either extend the above-mentioned trend of decisions to the novel
fact pattern at hand and exclude the evidence as beyond the scope of
the search, or it could ignore the reasons for restricting the "search inci-
dent" exception to the narrow purposes legitimating the search and
apply the general rule to a fact pattern which did not warrant such
application. The Court chose the latter course. °
The Court, finding that "[v]irtually all of the statements of this
Court affirming the existence of an unqualified authority to search inci-
dent to a lawful arrest are dicta,"41 examined the common law roots of
the "search incident" exception as well as later American cases which
considered the exception. However, as the dissenting opinion points out,
the Court conducted "an examination into prior practice which is not
only wholly superficial, but totally inaccurate and misleading."42 Not only
37. This implication was supported by the later decision of Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969). This case stands for the principle that the scope of a search incident to
an arrest is limited to the arrestee's person and the area immediately surrounding him.
Since, in Chimel,
[t]here was no constitutional justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for
extending the search beyond that area. The scope of the search was . . . 'unreason-
able' under the Fourth . . . Amendment ....
Id. at 768.
38. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
39. This point was admitted by the Government in the district court. United States v.
Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1094 n.17 (1972).
40. In addition, by holding that "'the fact of the lawful arrest' always establishes the
authority to conduct a full search of the arrestee's person . . ." the court adopted an
approach representing "a clear and marked departure from [the Court's] long tradition of
case-by-case adjudication of the reasonableness of searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment." 94 S. Ct. at 478 (dissent). See cases cited note 29 supra.
41. 94 S. Ct. at 474.
42. Id. at 482 (Marshall, J., dissenting). An example of the Court's misleading recount
of the history of this exception is its citation of People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E.
583 (1923) to support its contention. In fact, Chiagles states that evidence is only admissible
"if connected with the crime." Id. at 197, 142 N.E. at 584 (emphasis added). Since there
1974]
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is the Court's analysis of the origins of the search incident exception
prejudicially selective,4" but its statement that the validity of a full cus-
tody search incident to an arrest "has remained virtually unchallenged
until the present case"" had no basis in fact.45
The Robinson Court also rationalized its holding by giving two
reasons why it applied the "broadly stated rule' 46 that there exists "the
unqualified authority of [an] arresting authority to search the person
of [an] arrestee"4 7 to the facts of the case. First, the Court reasoned
that the search incident exception "rests quite as much on the need to
disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on the
need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial."4 The
Court thus believed that the exception was founded on two independent
bases and that it will still stand when one of those bases is not present,
as in the case at hand. Second, the Court believed that the increased
danger to a police officer due to his extended exposure to the suspect
after an arrest and while he is being transported to a police station
justifies a more thorough search than the protective pat-down for weapons
permitted by Terry.49 In addition, the Supreme Court, unlike the lower
court, refused to apply the reasoning of Terry to the search of Robinson
because of the recognition in Terry that there is a "distinction in purpose,
character, and extent between a search incident to an arrest and a limited
search for weapons ... ."" The Court in so holding did not take into
account the fact that the Terry Court recognized the authority to con-
duct a relatively extensive exploration of the person incident to an arrest
only because, although "justified in part by the acknowledged necessity
to protect the arresting officer from assault with a concealed weapon,...
[it] is also justified on other grounds . ... "I' Thus, the Terry Court
permitted a more extensive search of a suspect after arrest than a person
was no evidence connected with the crime charged against Robinson, Chiagles must be read
to support the dissent's position that evidence not connected with the crime is inadmissible.
43. The Court ignored, for example, Leigh v. Cole, 6 Cox Crim. Cas. 329 (Oxford Circ.
1863) which held that a constable did not have the right to search every person he took
into custody. The Court also ignored such early American cases as Haile v. Gardner, 82 Fla.
355, 91 So. 376 (1921) which declared that a search and seizure should not be inappropriate
to the requirements for making effective a lawful arrest.
44. 94 S. Ct. at 471.
45. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837
(1972) ; People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960) ;
People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967); Barnes v. State,
25 Wis. 2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264 (1964). In addition, other cases cited by the Court justified
searches incident to arrest upon the right to seize evidence, a situation totally inapplicable
to Robinson where there was no evidentiary basis for the search.
46. 94 S. Ct. at 473.
47. Id. at 472.
48. Id. at 476.
49. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court in Robinson implied that police protection by itself
provided "an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search
justification." 94 S. Ct. at 476.
50. 94 S. Ct. at 473, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968).
51. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968) (emphasis added).
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being subjected to a protective search for weapons, only because of the
need to seize evidence in the former type of search.
It would logically follow that if evidence of the crime charged was
not capable of being seized incident to an arrest, the Terry standards
would then apply. This argument was explicitly adopted by the dissenting
justices in Robinson. Mr. Justice Marshall, author of the dissenting
opinion, noted that the search incident to a valid arrest exception "does
not preclude further judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of that
search. It is the role of the judiciary, not of police officers, to delimit
the scope of exceptions to the warrant requirement. ' 52 In order to deter-
mine the scope of the "search incident" exception, the dissenting justices
examined the purposes of the exception as they applied to the particular
search in Robinson. They found that, as there was no evidentiary basis
for a search of Robinson,
[t]he only rationale for a search in this case ... is the removal
of weapons which the arrestee might use to harm the officer and
attempt an escape. This rationale, of course, is identical to the
rationale of the search permitted in Terry.
58
The dissenting opinion, therefore, concluded that whenever an officer
makes an in-custody arrest, he may conduct a limited frisk of the sus-
pect's outer clothing in order to remove any weapons the suspect might
have in his possession.54 Since the search of the cigarette package ex-
ceeded the arresting officer's need to protect himself,55 it "fell outside
the scope of a properly drawn 'search incident to [an] arrest' exception
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
56
Upon examination of the result reached in Robinson, it becomes
clear that what began as an exception to a more general rule has now
crystallized into an inflexible rule of law, applying equally to all crimes,
including traffic offenses, where little justification can be found for a
full-blown search. 7 Although the Court attempted to reconcile its holding
with past decisions, the conclusions of the dissenting justices appear to
be more logical and consistent with the line of cases decided before
Robinson which defined the permissible scope of a search incident to
arrest. The Court in previous cases, such as Preston v. United States,5"
52. 94 S. Ct. at 480 (dissenting opinion).
53. Id. at 484.
54. Id. at 483. The dissent noted that a Terry frisk provides sufficient protection of
police officers so that a full-blown search is not justified. Id. at 486.
55. [E]ven if the crumpled up cigarette package had in fact contained some sort
of small weapon, it would have been impossible for respondent [Robinson] to
have used it once the package was in the officer's hands.
Id.
56. Id. at 488.
57. Note, Searches of the Person Incident to Lawful Arrest, 69 CoLuM. L. REv. 866
(1969).
58. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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Terry v. Ohio,59 and Chimel v. California, ° looked at the reasons under-
lying the "broadly stated" search incident exception and found that
those reasons were not present in the fact patterns before them; conse-
quently, the Court in those cases concluded that the principles underlying
the fourth amendment would have been violated if these searches were
held to be reasonable." Similar reasoning should have been adopted by
the Court in Robinson in order to arrive at the conclusion that searches
for evidence incident to an arrest are not to be permitted in a situation
such as a traffic offense where there is no evidentiary basis for the search.
Although the decision does not expressly utilize a weighing test,
it appears that the Court attempted to strike a balance between the
government's interest in the safety of its law enforcement officials and
the personal integrity and constitutional freedom of the suspect after an
arrest. The Court concluded that the large number of police injuries
incurred during routine traffic stops necessitates a broader police power
to search than that allowed by a Terry pat-down.12 By applying the same
balancing test, the dissent once again reached a more equitable solution.
The dissent fully appreciated the danger present in all traffic arrests but
concluded, after examining all available data,63 that a Terry pat-down
would sufficiently protect law enforcement officials in all but the most
unusual situation, while simultaneously affording the person under arrest
the maximum amount of constitutional protection. 4 In addition, the dis-
senting Justices believed that the majority rule would increase the likeli-
hood that "a police officer, lacking probable cause to obtain a search
warrant, will use a traffic arrest as a pretext to conduct a search"65 and,
therefore concluded that a sufficient state interest did not exist to limit
fourth amendment rights which have been such a vital cornerstone of
American society.
The Robinson Court, as a result of its profound concern for police
safety, refused to examine the facts in Robinson consistently with the
Preston-Terry-Chimel trend of cases, in order to reach the desired result.
It can be expected that the Court, using Robinson as precedent, will in
the future further erode the reasonableness requirement of the fourth
59. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
60. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
61. See notes 29-36 supra and accompanying text.
62. 94 S. Ct. at 476.
63. After noting that 108 out of 112 police officers killed while on duty were killed
by either firearms or knives, the dissent noted that these weapons are "the very type of
weapons which will not go undetected in a properly conducted weapons frisk." 94 S. Ct.
at 486 & n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. That sufficient protection is afforded to an officer conducting a Terry pat-down is
evident upon an examination of its definition:
[Tihe officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body.
A thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and
back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down
to the feet.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1968).
65. 94 S. Ct. at 482.
CASES NOTED
amendment in order to provide law enforcement officials with even more
security at the expense of the citizen's right of privacy.66 Such a trend
"would preclude consideration of the reasonableness of any particular
search, and so would take away the protection that the [C]onstitution
is designed to provide.
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CLASS ACTIONS SCUTTLED IN
LAKE CHAMPLAIN
Four owners of property fronting on Lake Champlain in Vermont
brought a diversity action against International Paper Company for per-
mitting discharge from its pulp and paper-making plant to pollute the
lake, thereby causing damage to lake-front property. Each of the four
named plaintiffs alleged individual damages in excess of $10,000. The
action was brought as a class action under rule 23(b) (3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of approximately 200 property owners
and lessees, all of whom had suffered damages. It was not alleged that
each unnamed member of the class had suffered individual damages in
excess of $10,000, and the trial court was convinced "to a legal certainty"
that not every unnamed member of the class had suffered damages in that
amount. "[W]ith great reluctance," the United States District Court of
Vermont held1 that each class member must independently satisfy the re-
quirement as to jurisdictional amount,2 thus forcing dismissal of the
action as to all members of the class not meeting this requirement. The
court further held that in this case the problem of "defining an appro-
priate class" over which the court had jurisdiction was "insuperable."'
66. This theory is buttressed by the recent Supreme Court decision of United States
v. Edwards, 94 S. Ct. 1234 (1974) which held reasonable a search of an arrestee's clothing
ten hours after his arrest. Mr. Justice Stewart declared that the evidence so obtained
could be admissible "only by disregarding established Fourth Amendment principles firmly
embodied in many previous decisions of this Court." Id. at 1240 (dissent).
67. People v. Watlins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 18, 166 N.E.2d 433, 437 (1960).
1. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971).
2. "(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between-(1) citizens of different States . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
3. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 433 (D. Vt. 1971). Regarding the
problem of defining the class, the court said:
A determination before trial of the landowners actually encompassed within this
class would require the unnamed class members to appear and at least plead, and
perhaps prove facts substantiating an amount in controversy. This would elimi-
nate any advantage of a class action over joinder; a class action would there-
fore not be properly mintainable because class treatment would not be "superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
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